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Abstract—We address the problem of distributed state es-
timation of a linear dynamical process in an attack-prone
environment. Recent attempts to solve this problem impose
stringent redundancy requirements on the measurement and
communication resources of the network. In this paper, we take
a step towards alleviating such strict requirements by exploring
two complementary directions: (i) making a small subset of the
nodes immune to attacks, or “trusted”, and (ii) incorporating
diversity into the network. We define graph-theoretic constructs
that formally capture the notions of redundancy, diversity, and
trust. Based on these constructs, we develop a resilient estimation
algorithm and demonstrate that even relatively sparse networks
that either exhibit node-diversity, or contain a small subset of
trusted nodes, can be just as resilient to adversarial attacks as
more dense networks. Finally, given a finite budget for network
design, we focus on characterizing the complexity of (i) selecting a
set of trusted nodes, and (ii) allocating diversity, so as to achieve
a desired level of robustness. We establish that, unfortunately,
each of these problems is NP-complete.
I. INTRODUCTION
The distributed state estimation problem, in its most basic
form, concerns asymptotic reconstruction of the state of a dy-
namical process, via a group of sensor nodes interacting over a
network [1]–[9]. Each node observes only a portion of the state
dynamics and, hence, is reliant on local information exchanges
with neighboring nodes for tracking the entire state. An
underlying assumption that runs through almost all works on
this topic is that the sensor nodes work collaboratively towards
the common goal of state estimation. However, the recent surge
of activity devoted to the security of networked control systems
suggests that this may no longer be a reasonable assumption
to make. Thus, it is of prime importance to design algorithms
and networks that are robust to attacks on certain parts of the
system. For the specific problem under consideration, there are
only a few existing methods that have attempted to address this
concern. These works can be broadly classified in terms of
the assumptions made on the adversarial model. For example,
while [10]–[13] consider attack models that are limited in
scope, [14], [15] account for worst-case Byzantine adversarial
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attacks [16]. However, allowing for sophisticated attack models
comes at the expense of rather stringent requirements on the
communication network topology. Specifically, the guarantees
provided in [14], [15] hold only when the network exhibits
a sufficient amount of redundancy in both its measurement
and communication resources. We are thus motivated to ask:
Can one relax the redundancy requirements on the network,
and yet, tolerate a worst-case attack model? The goal of this
paper is to demonstrate that this can indeed be done.
Recently, in [17] and [18], two distinct ideas were proposed
that depart from the conventional approach of increasing
robustness through redundancy. In [17], the authors explored
the concept of device hardening, wherein a small subset of
carefully selected nodes, called trusted nodes, were made
immune to attacks. On the other hand, in [18], the authors
exploited the fact that the components of a large-scale net-
worked control system are typically quite diverse in their
hardware and software implementations. Such diversity, in
turn, implies that the vulnerabilities of different components
are not necessarily alike. The key observation here is that even
if an adversary manages to breach the security of a particular
type of component, its impact would remain limited to only
components of that type. In the context of consensus, when
the above ideas are leveraged appropriately, it has been shown
that even a relatively sparse network with trusted nodes [17],
or sufficient diversity [18], can still exhibit the same functional
robustness as that of a highly connected, dense network.
In light of the above developments, it is natural to ask
whether the ideas of trust and diversity can be adapted to
solve the resilient distributed state estimation problem. We note
that the problem at hand differs on several counts from the
typical consensus setting. Indeed, the former entails tracking
the state of an external (potentially unstable) dynamical system
using sensor nodes that are heterogeneous in terms of their
observations, features that are not exhibited by the basic
consensus problem. Consequently, while we borrow ideas from
[17] and [18], our techniques differ considerably from these
works. The main questions of interest to us are as follows.
• Can introducing trusted nodes and diversity into a sparse
network alleviate the redundancy requirements needed
for resilient distributed state estimation?
• How should one choose a set of trusted nodes, and
incorporate diversity, such that the resulting network is
endowed with a desired level of robustness?
In posing the above questions, our primary motivation is
to gain insights regarding the design of an attack-resilient,
robust sensor network. The multitude of applications of such
sensor networks, and the growing need for designing secure
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2networked control systems, justifies the relevance of the ques-
tions asked in this paper. In this context, our main contributions
are summarized as follows.
Contributions: In Section III, we introduce novel graph-
theoretic constructs that formally capture the three facets
of interest, namely redundancy, diversity, and trust. Intuition
dictates that the lack of any one of these facets should be
compensated by the presence of at least one of the other
two - this is an intrinsic feature of the topological properties
we introduce. We then develop an attack-resilient, provably-
correct filtering algorithm that exploits redundancy, diversity,
and trust to enable each non-compromised node to asymp-
totically recover the entire state, provided the graph-theoretic
conditions introduced in Section III are met.
One of the assumptions typically made while dealing with
Byzantine attack models is that the number of compromised
nodes is bounded in some appropriate sense [14]–[26] - an
assumption that we relax in Section III-C. In particular, once
an adversary has managed to breach the security of a particular
type of component (node), we allow it to compromise any
number of nodes of that type. We show how one can account
for such scenarios as long as the network is sufficiently
diverse in its measurement and communication resources. In
the process, we argue (see Remark 1) that one can employ
diversity as a means to tackle spoofing attacks, where an
attacker can impersonate the identities of multiple nodes.
Finally, we turn to the problem of designing a robust
network subject to cost constraints. Given a certain budget
that caps the number of nodes that can be made trusted, or the
amount of diversity that can be afforded, we focus on under-
standing (i) which nodes should be made trusted, and (ii) how
one should allocate diversity, in order to achieve a desired level
of robustness. In Section IV, we formulate these problems as
decision problems and characterize their complexity. We show
that, unfortunately, each of these problems is NP-complete.
A preliminary version of this paper appeared as [26], where
we only considered the impact of making certain nodes trusted.
II. NOTATION, TERMINOLOGY, AND PROBLEM SETUP
In this section, we formally describe the various models
considered throughout the paper; subsequently, we state the
problem of interest. We begin by introducing relevant notation.
Notation: A directed graph is denoted by G = (V, E), where
V = {1, · · · , N} is the set of nodes and E ⊆ V ×V represents
the edges. An edge from node j to node i, denoted by (j, i),
implies that node j can transmit information to node i. The
neighborhood (or in-neighborhood) of the i-th node is defined
as Ni , {j | (j, i) ∈ E}. A node j is said to be an out-neighbor
of node i if (i, j) ∈ E . The notation |V| is used to denote the
cardinality of a set V . The set of all eigenvalues (or modes)
of a matrix A is denoted by sp(A) = {λ ∈ C | det(A −
λI) = 0}, and the set of all unstable eigenvalues by ΛU (A) =
{λ ∈ sp(A) | |λ| ≥ 1}. The identity matrix of dimension r is
denoted Ir, and N+ is used to refer to the set of all positive
integers. The terms ‘communication graph’ and ‘network’ are
used interchangeably.
Plant and Observation Model: Consider a linear time-
invariant dynamical process
x[k + 1] = Ax[k], (1)
where k ∈ N is the discrete-time index, x[k] ∈ Rn is the
state vector, and A ∈ Rn×n is the system matrix. A network
G = (V, E) of N nodes monitor the state of this system. The
i-th node receives a measurement of the state, given by
yi[k] = Cix[k], (2)
where yi[k] ∈ Rri and Ci ∈ Rri×n. We define C ,[
CT1 · · · CTN
]T
and y[k] ,
[
yT1 [k] · · · yTN [k]
]T
as
the collective observation matrix, and collective measurement
vector, respectively. In the standard distributed state estimation
setup, each node i is tasked with asymptotically recovering the
entire state x[k]. We make the basic (necessary) assumption
that the pair (A,C) is detectable. However, for any given
i ∈ V , the pair (A,Ci) may not be detectable, thereby
necessitating inter-node communications constrained by the
topology of the network.
Diversity Model: We capture node heterogeneity and, in
particular, the fact that nodes have different vulnerabilities, by
employing the notion of colors as suggested in [18]. Specif-
ically, let the set of colors be denoted Γ = {B1, . . . , B|Γ|},
and let each node i be assigned a unique color ∆(i), where
∆(·) is a mapping from V to Γ. Let the node set be partitioned
accordingly as V = {VB1 , . . . ,VB|Γ|}.
Adversary Model: We consider a subset A ⊂ V of the
nodes in the network to be adversarial; the remaining regular
nodes will be denoted by the set R. The adversaries possess
complete knowledge of the network topology, the system
dynamics, and the algorithm employed by the non-adversarial
nodes. They can act collaboratively, and can even transmit
differing state estimates to different neighbors at the same
instant of time, as per the Byzantine fault model [16]. We
require all adversarial nodes to be of the same type or color,
i.e., the adversarial set is mono-chromatic.1 We do so to
capture the impact of diverse node vulnerabilities: breach of a
particular type of component (node) does not imply breach of
the other types. We now recall the following definitions from
[19] that quantify the number of adversaries in the network.
Definition 1. (f -local set) A set C ⊂ V is f -local if it contains
at most f nodes in the neighborhood of the other nodes, i.e.,
|Ni ∩ C| ≤ f, ∀i ∈ V \ C.
Definition 2. (f -local adversarial model) A set A of adver-
sarial nodes is f -locally bounded if A is an f -local set.
Within the class of mono-chromatic Byzantine adversarial
models, we shall consider two sub-cases: one where the
adversarial set A is f -locally bounded, and one where it is
potentially not. We will refer to the former as the f-local mono-
chromatic Byzantine adversary model, and to the latter as
simply the mono-chromatic Byzantine adversary model. Each
of these models has its own set of motivations and applies to
1Our results can be easily generalized to account for a poly-chromatic
adversarial set.
3different scenarios. For instance, the assumption of f -locality
aims to account for scenarios where the adversary is resource-
limited, and/or faces an increasing risk of getting detected with
each component it compromises. When such considerations no
longer apply, we relax the assumption of f -locality typically
made in the literature on resilient distributed algorithms [14]–
[26], and allow an adversary to compromise an arbitrary
number of nodes of a particular type. Our philosophy here is
as follows: once an adversary has figured out a way to breach
the security of a particular type of component (node), it is in
its interest to compromise more (if not all) nodes of that type,
if this does not incur any additional resource or risk on its part
(for example, malware and viruses).
Finally, let us note that the actual number and identities of
the adversarial nodes are not known to the regular nodes. We
do, however, assume that each regular node is aware of (i)
the true color of each of its neighbors, including those that
are adversarial; and (ii) the upper-bound f on the number of
adversaries in its neighborhood, whenever A is f -local.
Trust Model: We assume that a subset T ⊆ V of nodes
cannot be compromised by adversaries, i.e., T ∩ A = ∅.
Furthermore, we assume that each node is aware of the
identities of its trusted neighbors. Note that when |Γ| = 1, i.e.,
when all nodes are of the same type, we recover the setting in
[26], where only the impact of trusted nodes was considered.
With all the relevant models set up, we are now in position to
state the problem of interest. To this end, let xˆi[k] represent the
estimate of x[k] (the state of system (1)) maintained by node
i. Our objective in this paper will be to study how diversity
and trust can be exploited to solve the following problem.
Problem 1. (Resilient Distributed State Estimation) Given
an LTI system (1), a linear measurement model (2), and a
time-invariant directed communication graph G, design a set of
state estimate update and information exchange rules such that
limk→∞ ‖xˆi[k]−x[k]‖ = 0, ∀i ∈ R, regardless of the actions
of any f -local mono-chromatic set of Byzantine adversaries.2
III. RESILIENT DISTRIBUTED STATE ESTIMATION UNDER
MONO-CHROMATIC BYZANTINE ADVERSARIES
A. Characterizing Sufficient Graph-theoretic Conditions
In this section, we identify certain graph-theoretic conditions
that play a key role in our proposed solution to Problem 1. In
particular, these topological conditions are sufficient to solve
Problem 1 based on an approach that we develop later in
Section III-B. To proceed, we introduce the following notion
of (r,∆(·), T )-reachability.
Definition 3. ((r,∆(·), T )-reachable set) Consider a graph
G = (V, E) with a trusted node set T , where each node i ∈ V
is assigned a color ∆(i). Then, given r ∈ N+ ∪ {∞}, and a
non-empty set C ⊆ V , C is said to be an (r,∆(·), T )-reachable
set if ∃i ∈ C satisfying at least one of the following conditions:
(i) Redundancy: Node i has at least r neighbors outside
C, i.e., |Ni \ C| ≥ r.
2Later, in Section III-C, we investigate a variant of Problem 1 where the
f -locality assumption on the adversarial model is relaxed.
(ii) Diversity: Node i has at least 3 distinct colored neigh-
bors outside C, i.e., there exist nodes u, v, w ∈ Ni \ C,
such that ∆(u) 6= ∆(v) 6= ∆(w) 6= ∆(u).
(iii) Trust: Node i has at least one trusted neighbor outside
C, i.e., |{Ni \ C} ∩ T | ≥ 1.
When r =∞ (as in Section III-C), the above definition will
correspond to that of a (∆(·), T ) reachable set. The conditions
in Defn. 3 are illustrated in Figure 1.
· · ·
≥ r
C
i i i
(a) (b) (c)
C C
︷ ︸︸ ︷ trusted
node
Fig. 1: Illustration of sets that satisfy (r,∆(·), T )-reachability
as per Defn. 3, via (a) redundancy, (b) diversity, or (c) trust.
Next, we introduce the key topological property required to
solve Problem 1 based on our proposed approach.
Definition 4. (strongly (r,∆(·), T )-robust graph w.r.t. S)
Consider a graph G = (V, E) with a trusted node set T ,
where each node i ∈ V is assigned a color ∆(i). Then, given
r ∈ N+ ∪ {∞}, and a set S ⊆ V , G is strongly (r,∆(·), T )-
robust w.r.t. S if for all non-empty subsets C ⊆ V \ S, C is
(r,∆(·), T )-reachable.
When all nodes are of the same color, i.e., when ∆(i) =
∆(j),∀i, j ∈ V , and when the trusted set T is empty, we
recover the conventional notions of r-reachability [21], and
strong r-robustness w.r.t. a set S [14], from Defn.’s 3 and 4,
respectively. We note that the notion of strong (r,∆(·), T )-
robustness realizes the idea that there are multiple ways to
achieve a desired level of robustness in the underlying network:
by creating extra links between nodes (redundancy), or by
diversifying nodes (diversity), or by hardening a subset of
the nodes (trust), or by a combination of these approaches.
For instance, consider the graph in Figure 2(a), in which all
nodes have the same color (no diversity), and there is no
trusted node. The graph is strongly (3,∆(·), T )-robust w.r.t.
S = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, where ∆(i) = ∆(j), ∀i 6= j, and T = ∅.
We can make such a graph strongly (6,∆(·), T )-robust w.r.t.
S simply by adding extra links between nodes as shown in
Figure 2(b). At the same time, if we have three colors, then
we can assign them to nodes such that the graph becomes
strongly (6,∆(·), T )-robust w.r.t. S, without adding extra edges
or trusted nodes, as shown in Figure 2(c). Similarly, if node 4
is a trusted node, while all the remaining nodes are of the
same color, the graph again becomes strongly (6,∆(·), T )-
robust w.r.t. S, with no extra edges, as illustrated in Fig. 2(d).
Next, we recall the notion of source nodes [14].
Definition 5. (Source nodes) For each λj ∈ ΛU (A), let the
set Sj be defined as follows:
Sj , {i ∈ V|rank
[
A− λjIn
Ci
]
= n}. (3)
41 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11
12
S
(a)
1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11
12
S
(b)
1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11
12
S
(c)
1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11
12
S
(d)
Fig. 2: Illustration of different approaches, including re-
dundancy (b), diversity (c), and trust (d), to improve net-
work robustness. The set of source nodes in all figures is
S = {1, 2, . . . , 6}. Node 4 is a trusted node in Fig. 2(d). The
graphs in Figs. 2(b), 2(c), and 2(d) are all strongly (6,∆(·), T )-
robust w.r.t. S.
1 2 3 4 65
8
7
9 10
11
12
(a) G
L(j)0
1 2 3 4 65
L(j)1 87 9 10 11
12L(j)2
(b) Gj
Fig. 3: MEDAG illustration with f = 1. Sj = {1, 2, . . . , 6} is
the set of source nodes, and node 4 is trusted. Among the non-
source nodes in Gj , node 7 in L(j)1 has three distinct colored
neighbors in L(j)0 (diversity condition), whereas each of the
nodes in {8, 9, 10, 11} has a trusted neighbor in L(j)0 (trust
condition). At the same time, node 12 in L(j)2 has more than
(2f + 1) neighbors in L(j)0 ∪ L(j)1 (redundancy condition).
Then, Sj will be called the set of source nodes for λj .3
Let ΩU (A) ⊆ ΛU (A) contain the set of eigenvalues of A
for which V \ Sj is non-empty. Essentially, for each unstable
mode λj ∈ ΩU (A), the source nodes Sj can leverage their
own local measurements to estimate the portion of the state
corresponding to λj . However, to enable each non-source node
i ∈ V \ Sj to estimate that portion, a secure medium of
information flow from Sj to V \ Sj is necessary. To this end,
the concept of a Mode Estimation Directed Acyclic Graph
(MEDAG) was introduced in [14]. We now suitably modify
3In case i ∈ Sj , we will say that “node i can detect λj”. Each stable
eigenvalue is considered detectable w.r.t. the measurements of every node.
the definition of a MEDAG to account for diversity and trust.
Definition 6. ( (2f + 1,∆(·), T ) Mode Estimation Directed
Acyclic Graph (MEDAG)) Consider a mode λj ∈ ΩU (A).
Suppose there exists a spanning sub-graph Gj = (V, Ej) of G
with the following properties for all f -local, mono-chromatic
sets A with A ∩ T = ∅, and R = V \ A.
(i) If i ∈ {V \ Sj} ∩ R, then either |N (j)i | ≥ 2f + 1; or
|N (j)i ∩ T | ≥ 1; or ∃u, v, w ∈ N (j)i such that ∆(u) 6=
∆(v) 6= ∆(w) 6= ∆(u). Here, N (j)i = {l ∈ V|(l, i) ∈Ej} represents the neighborhood of node i in Gj .
(ii) There exists a partition of R into sets {L(j)0 , . . . ,L(j)Tj },
where Tj ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}, L(j)0 = Sj ∩ R 6= ∅, and
if i ∈ L(j)q (where 1 ≤ q ≤ Tj), then N (j)i ∩ R ⊆⋃q−1
r=0 L(j)r . Furthermore, N (j)i = ∅,∀i ∈ L(j)0 .
Then, we call Gj a (2f + 1,∆(·), T ) MEDAG for λj .
In the above definition, condition (i) requires each non-
source node in R to either have (2f + 1) neighbors, or a
trusted neighbor, or three distinct colored neighbors in Gj .
Condition (ii) in turn states that in Gj , the set R should admit
a partition into levels {L(j)0 , . . . ,L(j)Tj }, such that a node in
a particular level q has neighbors in R from levels strictly
lower than q, leading to an acyclic structure. An example of a
(2f + 1,∆(·), T ) MEDAG is shown in Fig. 3 for f = 1.
Construction of a (2f + 1,∆(·), T ) MEDAG: We briefly
discuss an algorithm that can be used to construct a (2f +
1,∆(·), T ) MEDAG (conditions for the existence of such a
MEDAG will be provided below). Suppose we are given a
graph G = (V, E) with a trusted node set T , where each
node i ∈ V is assigned a color ∆(i). For each λj ∈ ΩU (A),
our objective is to construct a sub-graph Gj satisfying the
conditions in Defn. 6 and, in the process, to identify the
sets N (j)i , ∀i ∈ V . With the sets N (j)i in hand, one can
implement the resilient distributed state estimation algorithm to
be described later in Section III-B. The MEDAG construction
algorithm requires each node i to maintain a counter ci(j) and
a list of indices N (j)i for each λj ∈ ΩU (A). These parameters
are initialized with ci(j) = 0 and N (j)i = ∅, for each i ∈ V .
Subsequently, the algorithm proceeds in rounds where in round
zero, each node in Sj broadcasts the message “1” to its out-
neighbors, sets ci(j) = 1, maintains N (j)i = ∅ for all future
rounds, and goes to sleep. A node i ∈ V \ Sj waits until it
either receives “1” from at least (2f + 1) distinct neighbors,
or from at least three distinct colored neighbors, or from at
least one trusted neighbor. When any one of these conditions
is eventually met, it sets ci(j) = 1, appends the labels of
each of the neighbors from which it received “1” to N (j)i ,
broadcasts the message “1” to its out-neighbors, and goes to
sleep. The MEDAG construction algorithm “terminates for λj”
if there exists Tj ∈ N+ such that ci(j) = 1 ∀i ∈ V , for all
rounds following round Tj . The objective of the algorithm is
to return a set of sets {N (j)i }, where λj ∈ ΩU (A), i ∈ V .4
4Here, we do not consider adversarial behaviour during the MEDAG
construction phase; however, such a possibility can be readily accounted for
following arguments similar to those in [14].
5In the following result, we establish that the notion of strong
(r,∆(·), T )-robustness tightly characterizes the existence of a
MEDAG as described in Defn. 6. In Section III-B, we will
demonstrate how the existence of such sub-graphs features in
the synthesis of our resilient filtering algorithm.
Theorem 1. For each λj ∈ ΩU (A), G contains a (2f +
1,∆(·), T ) MEDAG for λj if and only if G is strongly
(2f + 1,∆(·), T )-robust w.r.t. Sj .
Proof: “⇐=” Consider any λj ∈ ΩU (A), and suppose
that G is strongly (2f + 1,∆(·), T )-robust w.r.t. Sj . We
argue that the MEDAG construction algorithm described in
this section terminates and, upon termination, returns a set
of neighbor relations {N (j)i } that induce a sub-graph Gj
satisfying each of the two properties outlined in Defn. 6. To
this end, let the set of nodes that get “activated” during the
q-th round of the MEDAG construction algorithm be denoted
C(j)q , where we say that a node i is activated as soon as it sets
ci(j) to 1. Then, based on Defn.’s 3 and 4, it is easy to see
that C(j)0 = Sj is non-empty. By way of contradiction, suppose
the MEDAG construction algorithm does not terminate. This
implies the existence of a non-empty set P ⊆ V \Sj of nodes
that never get activated. However, since P is (2f+1,∆(·), T )-
reachable, each node i ∈ P must have received “1” from either
(2f + 1) nodes outside P , or from 3 distinct colored nodes
outside P , or from a trusted node outside P , causing it to
get activated. This leads to the desired contradiction, and we
conclude that all nodes must get activated eventually. It is easy
to see that such an activation process can take at most N − 1
rounds, since each new round activates at least one new node
until the time all nodes get activated. Thus, there must exist
some Tj ≤ N−1 such that
⋃Tj
q=0 C(j)q = V . Now consider any
f -local, mono-chromatic set A satisfying A ∩ T = ∅, and let
R = V \A. For each q ∈ {0, . . . , Tj}, define L(j)q , C(j)q ∩R.
Since {C(j)q }Tjq=0 partitions V , {L(j)q }Tjq=0 partitions R. Since
upon activation, a node goes to sleep and does not listen to
nodes that get subsequently activated, we have that for any
q ∈ {1, . . . , Tj}, if i ∈ C(j)q , then N (j)i ⊆
⋃q−1
r=0 C(j)r . Thus,
if i ∈ L(j)q , then N (j)i ∩ R ⊆
⋃q−1
r=0 L(j)r . To verify property
(ii) in Defn. 6, it remains to argue that L(j)0 = Sj ∩ R 6= ∅.
Assume to the contrary that Sj ∩ R = ∅, i.e., Sj ⊆ A. Thus,
R ⊆ V\Sj , and at the same timeR is non-empty since A is f -
local (see Defn. 2). Since G is strongly (2f+1,∆(·), T )-robust
w.r.t. Sj , it must then be that R is (2f +1,∆(·), T )-reachable
- a condition that is impossible to satisfy given the fact that
A is f -local, mono-chromatic and A ∩ T = ∅. This leads to
the desired contradiction, establishing property (ii) in Defn. 6.
Now consider any i ∈ {V \ Sj} ∩ R, and note that it must
belong to some L(j)q , where q ∈ {1, . . . , Tj}. Thus, it must get
activated at some point, and property (i) in Defn. 6 follows
by simply noting the conditions for activation of a node in the
MEDAG construction algorithm.
“=⇒” We prove necessity via contradiction. Given some
λj ∈ ΩU (A), let there exist a sub-graph Gj satisfying the
two properties in Defn. 6. Suppose G is not strongly (2f +
1,∆(·), T )-robust w.r.t. Sj . Thus, there exists a non-empty set
C ⊆ V\Sj that is not (2f+1,∆(·), T )-reachable. Consider the
trivial f -local set A = ∅ that satisfies A ∩ T = ∅.5 The sub-
graph Gj must contain a partition of R = V \A = V into sets
{L(j)q }Tjq=0 that satisfy property (ii) in Defn. 6. Accordingly,
let C get partitioned as C = ⋃Tjq=1 Fq , where Fq = C ∩ L(j)q
(note that C ∩ L(j)0 = ∅). Let p be the smallest integer such
that Fp is non-empty. Then, from property (ii) in Defn. 6, it
follows that for any i ∈ Fp, N (j)i contains elements from only
V \ C. However, as C is not (2f + 1,∆(·), T )-reachable, N (j)i
violates each of the three conditions in property (i) of Defn.
6, leading to the desired contradiction.
B. Algorithm and Analysis for f -local Mono-chromatic Byzan-
tine Adversaries
In this section, we develop an algorithm that leverages node-
diversity and trusted nodes to solve Problem 1. For clarity of
exposition, we make the following assumption on the system
matrix A.
Assumption 1. A has real, distinct eigenvalues.
Although the above assumption might seem restrictive, the
results that we derive subsequently can be generalized to
account for system matrices with arbitrary spectrum using
a more detailed technical analysis as in [14]. Since any A
satisfying Assumption 1 can be diagonalized via an appropriate
similarity transformation, we assume without loss of generality
that A is already in diagonal form. Specifically, suppose
A = diag(λ1, · · · , λn), where sp(A) = {λ1, . . . , λn}. Let
the component of the state vector x[k] corresponding to eigen-
value λj be denoted by x(j)[k]. Building on the general idea
developed in [14], for each λj ∈ ΩU (A), the source nodes Sj
and the non-source nodes V \Sj employ separate update rules
for estimating x(j)[k]. In particular, the source nodes maintain
local6 Luenberger observers for estimating x(j)[k], while the
non-source nodes rely on a resilient consensus based protocol
to achieve this task. For any node i, let the set of eigenvalues it
can detect be denoted by Oi, and let O¯i = sp(A) \Oi. Then,
the following result from [14] states that node i can estimate
the components of x[k] corresponding to the eigenvalues in Oi,
(i.e., the locally detectable portion of x[k]) without interacting
with its neighbors.
Lemma 1. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then, for each i ∈ R,
a local Luenberger observer can be constructed that ensures
limk→∞ |xˆ(j)i [k] − x(j)[k]| = 0,∀λj ∈ Oi, where xˆ(j)i [k]
denotes the estimate of x(j)[k] maintained by node i.
In what follows, we develop a filtering algorithm that allows
each regular node to estimate the locally undetectable portion
of the dynamics, despite the potential presence of adversarial
nodes in its neighborhood. The proposed filtering algorithm,
adapted to account for node-diversity and the presence of
trusted nodes, involves the following steps.
5Here, we adhere to the convention that an empty set is mono-chromatic.
6Here, by ‘local’, we imply that such observers can be constructed and run
without any information from neighbors.
6For each λj ∈ O¯i, i ∈ R updates xˆ(j)i [k] as follows.
1) At each time-step k, node i collects estimates of x(j)[k]
received from only those neighbors that belong to
N (j)i ⊆ Ni. Recall that N (j)i represents neighbors of
node i in the MEDAG Gj (see Definition 6).
2) If N (j)i ∩ T 6= ∅, then xˆ(j)i [k] is updated as follows:
xˆ
(j)
i [k + 1] = λj
 ∑
l∈N (j)i ∩T
w¯
(j)
il xˆ
(j)
l [k]
 , (4)
where the weights w¯(j)il are non-negative and chosen to
satisfy
∑
l∈N (j)i ∩T
w¯
(j)
il = 1.
3) If N (j)i ∩ T = ∅, but there exist three distinct col-
ored nodes in N (j)i , then node i sorts the estimates
of x(j)[k] received from N (j)i in descending order.
Upon such sorting, let the indices of the nodes in
N (j)i be {n1, . . . , n|N (j)i |}, i.e., xˆ
(j)
n1 [k] ≥ xˆ(j)n2 [k] . . . ≥
xˆ
(j)
n|N(j)
i
|
[k].7 Define m , min{p : ∆(np) 6= ∆(n1)},
and M , max{p : ∆(np) 6= ∆(n|N (j)i |)}. It can
be easily verified that, when N (j)i contains at least 3
distinct colored nodes, we have M ≥ m. Accordingly,
let R(j)i [k] = ∪Mp=mnp. Then, xˆ(j)i [k] is updated as
follows:
xˆ
(j)
i [k + 1] = λj
 ∑
l∈R(j)i [k]
w˜
(j)
il [k]xˆ
(j)
l [k]
 , (5)
where the weights w˜(j)il [k] are non-negative and chosen
to satisfy
∑
l∈R(j)i [k]
w˜
(j)
il [k] = 1.
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4) If N (j)i ∩ T = ∅, and node i does not contain three
distinct colored neighbors in N (j)i , then it first sorts the
estimates of x(j)[k] received from N (j)i in descending
order, just as in Step 3. It then removes the highest and
lowest f estimates (i.e., removes 2f estimates in all),
and updates xˆ(j)i [k] as follows:
xˆ
(j)
i [k + 1] = λj
 ∑
l∈M(j)i [k]
w
(j)
il [k]xˆ
(j)
l [k]
 , (6)
where M(j)i [k] ⊂ N (j)i (⊆ Ni) is the set of nodes from
which node i chooses to accept estimates of x(j)[k] at
time-step k, after removing the f highest and f lowest
estimates from N (j)i . The weights w(j)il [k] are non-
negative and chosen to satisfy
∑
l∈M(j)i [k]
w
(j)
il [k] = 1.
7Here, we have suppressed the dependence of the indices np on i, j and k
for clarity of exposition.
8In words, from each end, node i keeps rejecting estimates until it
encounters a node with color different from that of the node with the most
extreme estimate on that end. See Fig. 4(b) for an illustration of this step.
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Fig. 4: Illustration of various steps in the LFRE Algorithm.
(a) Node i utilizes estimates from trusted neighbours in N (j)i
to update its state. (b) If N (j)i has no trusted node but
contains three distinct colored nodes (blue, red, and white in
Fig. 4(b)), then node i sorts estimates from nodes in N (j)i in
descending order. From the top (respectively bottom), node i
determines the smallest index nm (respectively largest index
nM ) of the node with color different than the color of the
node with the most extreme estimate on that end. It then
only considers estimates from nodes with indices within the
range nm and nM . (c) If N (j)i neither has a trusted node nor
three distinct colored nodes, then node i sorts the received
estimates in descending order, removes the f -largest and f -
smallest estimates, and considers only the remaining estimates
in its update rule.
We refer to the above algorithm as the Local-Filtering based
Resilient Estimation (LFRE) algorithm for f -local mono-
chromatic Byzantine adversaries; the steps of this algorithm
are illustrated in Fig. 4. The following key result of our
paper demonstrates how redundancy, diversity, and trust can
be leveraged to perform resilient distributed state estimation.
Theorem 2. Consider the system (1) and measurement model
(2), and suppose Assumption 1 holds. Let the communica-
tion graph G be strongly ((2f + 1),∆(·), T )-robust w.r.t.
Sj ,∀λj ∈ ΩU (A). Then, the LFRE algorithm for f -local
mono-chromatic Byzantine adversaries solves Problem 1.
Proof: Consider an f -local mono-chromatic Byzantine
adversarial set A, and let R = V \ A. Based on Lemma 1,
notice that a regular node i ∈ R can asymptotically estimate
each component of the state vector x[k] corresponding to its
set of detectable eigenvalues Oi. It remains to show that node
i ∈ R can also recover x(j)[k], ∀λj ∈ O¯i, based on the LFRE
algorithm for f -local mono-chromatic adversaries. To this end,
we argue that for each λj ∈ ΩU (A), xˆ(j)i [k] converges to x[k]
asymptotically for all i ∈ R.
Consider a mode λj ∈ ΩU (A), and notice that based on
Theorem 1, there exists a sub-graph Gj satisfying all the
properties of a (2f + 1,∆(·), T ) MEDAG. Specifically, the
set of regular nodes R = V \ A can be partitioned into dis-
joint levels {L(j)0 , . . . ,L(j)q , . . . ,L(j)Tj }. We induct on the level
7number q. For q = 0, recall that L(j)0 = Sj ∩R by definition.
Hence, it follows from Lemma 1 that for each i ∈ L(j)0 ,
limk→∞ e
(j)
i [k] = 0, where e
(j)
i [k] = xˆ
(j)
i [k] − x(j)[k]. Next,
consider a node i in level q = 1. We split our subsequent
analysis into three separate cases.
Case 1: Suppose N (j)i ∩ T 6= ∅. Then, based on Step 2 of
the LFRE algorithm for f -local mono-chromatic adversaries,
node i employs the update rule (4). In this case, the error
e
(j)
i [k] evolves as follows:
e
(j)
i [k + 1] = λj
 ∑
l∈N (j)i ∩T
w¯
(j)
il e
(j)
l [k]
 , (7)
where we used that (i) x(j)[k + 1] = λjx(j)[k] based on
the structure of the A matrix, and (ii) the convexity of the
weights w¯(j)il . Based on the fact that T ⊆ R, and property (ii)
of a MEDAG in Defn. 6, we have that N (j)i ∩ T ⊆ L(j)0 .
It then follows from (7) and the foregoing discussion that
limk→∞ e
(j)
i [k] = 0.
Case 2: Suppose N (j)i ∩T = ∅, but there exist three distinct
colored nodes in N (j)i . Then, based on Step 3 of the filtering
algorithm, node i employs the update rule (5). In this case, the
error e(j)i [k] evolves as follows:
e
(j)
i [k + 1] = λj
 ∑
l∈R(j)i [k]
w˜
(j)
il [k]e
(j)
l [k]
 , (8)
where we have once again used that x(j)[k + 1] = λjx(j)[k],
and that the weights w˜(j)il [k] are convex. Observe that whenever
N (j)i contains three distinct colored nodes, R(j)i [k] is guar-
anteed to be non-empty by definition. We now claim that at
each time-step k, e(j)l [k] lies in the convex hull of the points
e
(j)
s [k], s ∈ L(j)0 , for all l ∈ R(j)i [k]. To this end, fix a time-
step k, and suppose that the node with the highest estimate
of x(j)[k] in N (j)i , namely node n1, is regular. Then, we
have that for each l ∈ R(j)i [k], xˆ(j)l [k] ≤ xˆ(j)n1 [k], where
n1 ∈ N (j)i ∩ R ⊆ L(j)0 . The last inclusion follows from
property (ii) in Defn. 6. Now consider the case when node
n1 is adversarial. Then, given the mono-chromaticity of the
adversarial model, it must be that node nm, as defined in
Step 3, is regular, since ∆(nm) 6= ∆(n1). Furthermore, based
on how R(j)i [k] is defined in Step 3, it follows that for each
l ∈ R(j)i [k], xˆ(j)l [k] ≤ xˆ(j)nm [k], where nm ∈ N (j)i ∩R ⊆ L(j)0 .
Thus, we have established that at each time-step k, e(j)l [k] ≤
max
s∈L(j)0
e
(j)
s [k], ∀l ∈ R(j)i [k]. An identical argument re-
veals that at each time-step k, e(j)l [k] ≥ mins∈L(j)0 e
(j)
s [k],
∀l ∈ R(j)i [k]. The above discussion, coupled with (8), and
the fact that limk→∞ e
(j)
s [k] = 0,∀s ∈ L(j)0 , readily implies
that limk→∞ e
(j)
i [k] = 0.
Case 3: Suppose N (j)i ∩T = ∅, and there do not exist three
distinct colored nodes in N (j)i . Then, based on property (i) of
a MEDAG in Defn. 6, it must be that |N (j)i | ≥ (2f+1). In this
case, node i employs the update rule (6), which corresponds
precisely to the resilient filtering algorithm developed in [14]
for f -local Byzantine adversarial models. Thus, for this case,
the fact that limk→∞ e
(j)
i [k] = 0 follows directly from the
arguments in [14].
This completes the analysis for the base case q = 1. Using
arguments similar to those for the base case, and a simple
inductive reasoning as in [14], one can establish that the result
holds for all levels q ∈ {1, . . . , Tj}.
C. Resilient Distributed State Estimation Under Mono-
chromatic Byzantine Adversaries
We now briefly discuss how the developments in the previ-
ous section can be easily generalized to account for a more
powerful adversarial model wherein the assumption of f -
locality is relaxed, i.e., we no longer require the adversarial
set A to be f -local. We will, however, continue to assume
that A is mono-chromatic and, to make the discussion mean-
ingful, that A ⊂ V. The appropriate concept that we need
here is (∞,∆(·), T )-reachability, to be henceforth referred
to as (∆(·), T ) reachability - a special case of (r,∆(·), T )-
reachability in Defn. 3 with r = ∞, where the reachability
condition can clearly only be satisfied via diversity or trust. The
more stringent concept of (∆(·), T )-reachability seeks to make
up for the inadequacy of the traditional notion of redundancy
in coping with a mono-chromatic Byzantine adversarial model.
Indeed, once f -locality is relaxed, a node may have direct
or indirect paths from several informative nodes and, yet,
fall short of estimating the state dynamics. In particular, an
adversary can compromise all such informative nodes if they
are of the same type, and not a part of the trusted set T . This
highlights the importance of incorporating diversity and/or
trust into the measurement and communication structure of
the network as alternatives to incorporating redundancy.
Note that a strongly (∆(·), T )-robust graph w.r.t. S and a
(∆(·), T ) MEDAG are simply special cases of Defn.’s 4 and
6, respectively, where the redundancy parameter is ∞. Then,
following identical arguments as in Thm. 1, one can establish
that for each λj ∈ ΩU (A), G contains a (∆(·), T ) MEDAG
for λj if and only if G is strongly (∆(·), T )-robust w.r.t. Sj . To
estimate its locally undetectable portion of the state, suppose
each node i ∈ R executes only the first 3 steps of the filtering
algorithm in Section III-B, to update xˆ(j)i [k],∀λj ∈ O¯i. Let us
call this algorithm the LFRE algorithm for mono-chromatic
Byzantine adversaries. We then have the following result.
Theorem 3. Consider the system (1) and measurement model
(2), and suppose Assumption 1 holds. Let the communication
graph G be strongly (∆(·), T )-robust w.r.t. Sj ,∀λj ∈ ΩU (A).
Then, the LFRE algorithm for mono-chromatic Byzantine
adversaries solves the variant of Problem 1 corresponding to
a mono-chromatic Byzantine adversary model.
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Theorem 2.
8Remark 1. (Implications for Countering Spoofing Attacks):
Recently, in the context of multi-robot coordination, the authors
in [27], [28] propose methods to tackle the so called “Sybil at-
tack”, where an attacker spoofs or impersonates the identities
of existing agents to gain a disproportionate advantage in the
network. The methods developed in [27], [28] are based on
analyzing the physics of wireless signals. Since such signals
are invariably corrupted by environment and channel noise,
the guarantees in [27], [28] are of a probabilistic nature. In
contrast, we claim that the ideas developed in this section
can provide deterministic guarantees in the face of spoofing
attacks. The key enabling observation here is that even if an
adversary generates multiple identities of an existing regular
node, each such identity would share the same digital signature
as that of the node being replicated. In other words, the node
being spoofed along with its replicated identities would all be
of the same type, or color. Thus, regardless of the number of
fake identities, as long as the conditions in Theorem 3 are met,
our techniques would go through.
IV. ON THE COMPLEXITY OF INCORPORATING
DIVERSITY AND TRUST
In practice, hardening sensors against attacks (i.e., making
nodes trusted), and implementing several variants of nodes
(i.e., making the network diverse), comes at a cost. Thus, it is
natural to consider the design problem of (i) finding a trusted
set of minimum cardinality; and/or (ii) finding the minimum
number of colors, and the corresponding allocation of colors
to nodes, so as to make the resulting network strongly-robust
to a desired extent. In what follows, we separately explore the
complexity of each of these problems.
A. On the Complexity of Selecting Trusted Nodes
To isolate the complexity of selecting trusted nodes, we
consider a scenario where all nodes are of the same color (i.e.,
∆(i) = ∆(j),∀i, j ∈ V). To proceed, we formally state the
problem of interest and then characterize its complexity.
Problem 2. (Trusted Strong-Robustness Augmentation
(TSRA)) Given a system model (1), a measurement model (2),
a communication graph G = (V, E) where all nodes are of
the same color (i.e., ∆(i) = ∆(j),∀i, j ∈ V), and positive
integers r, t, does there exist a set of trusted nodes T of
cardinality t, such that G is strongly (r,∆(·), T )-robust w.r.t.
Sj , ∀λj ∈ ΩU (A)?
To characterize the complexity of the TSRA problem, we
will provide a reduction from the NP-hard Set Cover (SC)
problem, defined as follows.
Definition 7. (Set Cover (SC)) Given a collection of elements
U = {1, . . . , p}, a set of subsets F = {F1, . . . ,Fm} of U ,
and a positive integer t, do there exist t subsets in F whose
union is U?
Theorem 4. The TSRA problem is NP-complete.
Proof: We first argue that TSRA ∈ NP. To see this, notice
that for “yes” instances of the problem, the set of trusted nodes
T of size t yields a certificate w.r.t. the MEDAG construction
algorithm described in Section III-A. Specifically, based on
Theorem 1, for each λj ∈ ΩU (A), the MEDAG construction
algorithm terminates if and only if G is strongly (r,∆(·), T )-
robust w.r.t. Sj ; thus, such an algorithm can be used to verify
the desired graph property. That this verification algorithm
has polynomial-time complexity follows from an analogous
argument made in [14, Proposition 2].
Next, we establish that TSRA is NP-hard. To this end, given
an instance of SC, we first construct an instance of TSRA
as follows. We consider a scalar unstable dynamical system
x[k + 1] = λx[k], and construct an associated communication
graph G with node set V = U¯ ∪ F¯ , where U¯ = {u1, . . . , up},
and F¯ = {f1, . . . , fm}. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , p}, node ui ∈ U¯
corresponds to element i of U , and for each j ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
node fj ∈ F¯ corresponds to subset Fj ∈ F . If i ∈ Fj , then
a directed edge is added from node fj to node ui in G. Each
node fj ∈ F¯ is allocated a non-zero measurement of the state
x[k]. The cardinality of the trusted set T is set to t, and the
desired level of strong-robustness is given by r = |F|. Clearly,
given any instance of SC, the above TSRA instance can be
constructed in polynomial-time. We now argue that the answer
to any given instance of SC is “yes” if and only if the answer
to the constructed instance of TSRA is “yes”.
Suppose the answer to the SC instance is “yes”. Thus, there
exists a set of t subsets of F whose union is U . Without loss
of generality, let these subsets be {F1, . . . ,Ft}. Let the set
of trusted nodes T be {f1, . . . , ft}. We first observe that the
set of source nodes S (the set of nodes that can detect λ) of
G is precisely the set F¯ . Thus, T ⊆ S . To establish that G
is strongly (r,∆(·), T )-robust w.r.t. S , we pick a non-empty
subset C ⊆ V\S = U¯ . Since {F1, . . . ,Ft} cover U , Nui∩T 6=∅,∀ui ∈ U¯ . Thus, C is (r,∆(·), T )-reachable, and the answer
to the constructed instance of TSRA is “yes”.
To show the converse, we proceed via contraposition. Sup-
pose the answer to the SC instance is “no”. In other words, no
t subsets of F cover U . Consider any set of trusted nodes T of
cardinality t. LetM = F¯ ∩T . We first consider the case when
M is non-empty. In this case, there exists at least one node
ui ∈ U¯ that has neighbors (if any) only in F¯ \M. Noting that
the source set S = F¯ , we consider the non-empty set C = {ui}
contained in V \ S. Since r = |F¯ |, it follows that ui neither
has a trusted neighbor nor has at least r neighbors. Thus, C is
not (r,∆(·), T )-reachable.9 For analyzing the case when M
is empty, we observe that there must exist at least one node
ui ∈ U¯ such that Nui ⊂ F¯ ; else, each Fj ∈ F would coverU , and the answer to SC would be trivially “yes”, leading to a
contradiction. It then follows that C = {ui} is not (r,∆(·), T )-
reachable. Consequently, G is not strongly (r,∆(·), T )-robust
w.r.t. S, regardless of the way t trusted nodes are picked in G.
In other words, the answer to the constructed TSRA instance
is “no”. This completes the proof.
Given the above result, we now briefly describe a simple
greedy heuristic that finds a potentially sub-optimal set of
trusted nodes in polynomial time.
Greedy Heuristic for Selecting Trusted Nodes: Consider
9Note that as ∆(i) = ∆(j), ∀i, j ∈ V in TSRA, the requirements for
(r,∆(·), T )-reachability cannot be met via diversity (item (ii) in Defn. 3).
9the setup in Problem 2, and suppose we need to find a set
of trusted nodes T such that G is strongly (r,∆(·), T )-robust
w.r.t. Sj , ∀λj ∈ ΩU (A). We proceed as follows. Fix a λj ∈
ΩU (A), and suppose each node i ∈ V \ Sj is reachable from
Sj (since otherwise, there is no hope of achieving the desired
property). Our proposed greedy algorithm proceeds in rounds
l, where in each round precisely one node is made trusted,
if needed. Two lists are maintained and updated each round:
a list of “active” nodes Wj(l), and a list of trusted nodes
Tj(l), with Wj(0) initially set to Sj , and Tj(0) to ∅. At the
beginning of round l, where l ≥ 1, each node in Wj(l − 1) \
Tj(l − 1) is a candidate for being made trusted in that round.
For each such candidate node v ∈ Wj(l − 1) \ Tj(l − 1), we
run a virtual bootstrap percolation10 process by making node v
trusted temporarily, and computing the number of new nodes
it activates in the process. Here, an inactive node gets activated
if it either has at least r active neighbors, or a trusted active
neighbor. Let δ(v) denote the new nodes activated by node
v. Having run this virtual percolation process separately for
each v ∈ Wj(l − 1) \ Tj(l − 1), we greedily pick τ(l) ∈
argmaxv∈Wj(l−1)\Tj(l−1) |δ(v)| to be trusted in round l, i.e.,
we pick the node that activates the maximum number of nodes.
Subsequently, we update Wj(l) = Wj(l − 1) ∪ δ(τ(l)), and
Tj(l) = Tj(l−1)∪τ(l). Let l¯j be the smallest integer such that
Wj(l¯j) = V . We then say that the greedy algorithm described
above terminates in round l¯j . It is easy to see that l¯j ≤ N −
1, and that on termination, Tj(l¯j) is such that G is strongly
(r,∆(·), Tj(l¯j))-robust w.r.t. Sj . Thus, we can run the above
greedy heuristic for each λj ∈ ΩU (A), and obtain the desired
trusted set T = ∪λj∈ΩU (A)Tj(l¯j).
A rigorous theoretical characterization of the performance
of the above greedy heuristic is beyond the scope of this paper.
However, it is not too hard to verify that this heuristic does
output a trusted set of optimal size for simple graphs such as
star graphs, directed trees, rings and complete graphs.
B. On the Complexity of Allocating Diversity
We now turn our attention to the problem of allocating
colors to the nodes from a set of specified cardinality so
as to achieve a certain level of strong-robustness. To isolate
the challenges associated with this problem, our subsequent
analysis will focus exclusively on scenarios where the trusted
set T is empty. Next, we formally state the problem of interest.
Problem 3. (q-Colored Strong-Robustness Augmentation (q-
CSRA)) Given a system model (1), a measurement model (2),
a communication graph G = (V, E) with an empty trusted
set T , and positive integers r, q, does there exist an allocation
∆ : V → {1, . . . , q}, such that G is strongly (r,∆(·), T )-robust
w.r.t. Sj , ∀λj ∈ ΩU (A)?
Let us note that when q < 3, the q-CSRA problem as
stated above boils down to checking whether the given graph
10Given a graph G and a threshold r ≥ 2, bootstrap percolation can be
viewed as a process of spread of activation where one starts off with an initially
active set. The process then evolves over the network in rounds, where in each
round an inactive node becomes active if and only if it has at least r active
neighbors; here, we modify the activation rule to suit our purpose.
G is strongly r-robust w.r.t. Sj , ∀λj ∈ ΩU (A). In [14], by
exploiting a connection to the process of bootstrap percolation,
it was shown that this can be done in polynomial-time. Thus,
the complexity of the q-CSRA problem remains to be char-
acterized only when q ≥ 3. In the remainder of this section,
we establish that the 3-CSRA problem is computationally hard
by providing a reduction from the NP-complete 3-Disjoint Set
Cover (3-DSC) problem, defined as follows [29].
Definition 8. (3-Disjoint Set Cover (3-DSC)) Given a col-
lection of elements U = {1, . . . , p}, and a set of subsets
F = {F1, . . . ,Fm} of U , can F be partitioned into three
disjoint collections of subsets, such that the union of the
subsets within each such collection covers U?
Theorem 5. The 3-CSRA problem is NP-complete.
Proof: The fact that CSRA ∈ NP follows an analogous
argument as in Theorem 4. In particular, given any “yes”
instance of the problem, the associated allocation ∆ yields a
certificate w.r.t. the MEDAG construction algorithm in Section
III-A that acts as a polynomial-time verifier.
Given an instance of 3-DSC, we construct an instance of
3-CSRA in a manner identical to that in the proof of Theorem
4, and adhere to the notation used in that proof. Note however
that unlike TSRA, the cardinality t of the trusted set T plays
no role in 3-CSRA, and hence requires no specification while
constructing the instance of 3-CSRA. It is easy to see that
given any instance of 3-DSC, the above 3-CSRA instance
can be constructed in polynomial-time. We now argue that
the answer to any given instance of 3-DSC is “yes” if and
only if the answer to the constructed instance of 3-CSRA is
“yes”. Throughout the proof, we will assume that |F| ≥ 3, as
otherwise, the answer to 3-DSC is trivially “no”.
Suppose the answer to the 3-DSC instance is “yes”. Thus,
F can be partitioned into 3 disjoint set covers of U . Let
these partitions be denoted P1 = {Fi1 , . . . ,Fip1}, P2 ={Fj1 , . . . ,Fjp2}, and P3 = {Fk1 , . . . ,Fkp3 }, where pi =|Pi|, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Let the corresponding sets of nodes in F¯
be denoted P¯1, P¯2 and P¯3. Consider the following allocation
of colors to the nodes in F¯ : ∆(fis) = 1,∀is ∈ P¯1,
∆(fjs) = 2,∀js ∈ P¯2, and ∆(fks) = 3,∀ks ∈ P¯3. The
assignment of colors to the nodes in U¯ is arbitrary, i.e., each
ui ∈ U¯ is assigned any one of the three colors. Noting that the
set of source nodes S is precisely the set F¯ , we claim that G
is strongly (r,∆(·), T )-robust w.r.t. S. To see this, pick any
non-empty subset C ⊆ V \ S = U¯ . Since P1, P2 and P3 each
cover U , it follows that every ui ∈ U¯ has a neighbor in each
of the sets P¯1, P¯2 and P¯3, i.e., each ui ∈ U¯ has 3 distinct
colored neighbors. Thus, C is (r,∆(·), T )-reachable, and the
answer to the constructed instance of 3-CSRA is “yes”.
We now establish the converse. Suppose the answer to the
3-DSC instance is “no”. In other words, no matter how one
partitions F into 3 disjoint collections of subsets, not all three
such collections can each cover U . We first argue that G cannot
be made strongly (r,∆(·), T )-robust w.r.t. S, if one uses fewer
than three colors to color the set F¯ . To see this, note that if
fewer than three colors are used to color F¯ , then G will be
strongly (r,∆(·), T )-robust w.r.t. S if and only if each fj ∈ F¯
is a neighbor of every ui ∈ U¯ , since each ui would need to
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have precisely r = |F¯ | neighbors to meet the (r,∆(·), T )-
reachability requirement (recall that T = ∅). However, that
would imply Fj = U ,∀Fj ∈ F . This in turn would collapse
the size of the set F to just 1 (since all its elements would be
identical), contradicting the fact that |F| ≥ 3.
Next, consider any allocation of these colors to the nodes in
F¯ , where each of the three colors is used at least once. Such a
coloring naturally partitions F¯ into 3 disjoint non-empty sets,
say P¯1, P¯2 and P¯3. Since the answer to 3-DSC is “no”, there
must exist some node ui ∈ U¯ = V \S, such that ui contains at
most 2 distinct colored neighbors from F¯ . Since P¯1, P¯2 and
P¯3 are each non-empty, and r = |F¯ | = |P¯1| + |P¯2| + |P¯3|,
it follows that |Nui | < r. Consequently, {ui} ∈ V \ S is
not (r,∆(·), T )-reachable. Based on the above discussion, we
conclude that there does not exist any allocation ∆ : V →
{1, 2, 3} that renders G strongly (r,∆(·), T )-robust w.r.t. S.
The answer to the constructed instance of 3-CSRA is thus
“no”. This completes the proof.
At the moment, we do not have a clean heuristic algorithm
to allocate diversity; we reserve this as future work.
V. CONCLUSION
We introduced novel graph-theoretic constructs to study
the impacts of redundancy, diversity, and trust in the context
of resilient distributed state estimation. We then proposed
an attack-resilient algorithm that appropriately leverages each
of the three above facets, and provides provable guarantees.
Roughly speaking, we established that even relatively sparse
networks that are either diverse, or contain a small subset of
trusted nodes, can exhibit the same functional robustness as
densely connected networks. Finally, we separately studied the
complexity of (i) selecting a trusted node set, and (ii) allocating
diversity, in order to achieve a prescribed level of robustness.
Our analysis revealed that each such problem is NP-complete;
in the future, we plan to explore approximation algorithms
with provable guarantees for each of these problems.
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